BOOK REVIEW

This book review was completed in partial fulfillment of the requirements for graduation.  “A Fierce Domain: Conflict in Cyberspace, 1986 to 2012”, is a volume edited by Jason Healey in Washington, DC, and published by the Cyber Conflict Studies Association in 2013. With 352 pages of case studies, graphs, a glossary, and charts, it can be purchased in hardback for $35. The ISBN is 978-0-9893274-1-153500.

Written in part as a military history, in part as a guide to policymakers, the thesis of the book is that cyber conflict “is not so new that it does not have its own history”[1] with several wake up calls in the last twenty-five years for the United States Government, the nation’s lead defense against cyber attacks. The book lists and analyzes topically the events and precipitous effects that have led up to the current state of cyber conflict, beginning in 1986 with the Cuckoo’s Egg and Morris Worm (1988) and ending in 2012 with Stuxnet and Estonia (2007). The examples and documentation cited support the claim that this field and the cases cited are not anomalies, but interconnected incidents that provide a rich historical narrative for study. Collected and presented in this manner, the author achieves his aims in presenting the first ever history book of cyber conflict history.

The books narrative and case studies begin in 1986, but before 1980, the elements necessary for cyber conflict were not in place. Electronic warfare dates back to the American Civil War when Confederate telegraphs were captured and used for counter measures. The easily-accessible, decentralized yet interconnected communication systems based in computer networks set the stage for the advent of cyber conflict history beginning with the Morris Worm in 1988. The incident highlighted the systemic lack of cybersecurity causing “up to 10 percent of the Internet to crash”[2], demonstrating where the tools of “agility and subject matter knowledge”[3] for maintaining defenses were kept – in the private sector. In 1997 and 1998, Operations ELIGIBLE RECIEVER and SOLAR MOONRISE demonstrated the ability of red teams to penetrate both classified and unclassified defenses. The result of the exercise was a new organizational structure for cyber incident response mechanism mirroring a DEFCON system of categorization to “better defeat a sustained cyber attack.”[4]  Also in 1998, MOONLIGHT MAZE was a joint operation to “combat” a sustained external intrusion into Air, Space, Defense, and research and development institutions, believed to be Russians who were intent on retrieving science and technology information. Later, in 2005, a set of intrusions believe to be Chinese espionage called TITAN RAIN focused theft on the DoD, DHS, State, Energy, and defense contractors. May of 2007, Estonia experienced a cyber attack from Russia that was a “tactical and strategic defeat.”[5] In 2008, the cyber attacks on Georgia coordinated with an invasion of Russia. Later that year, BUCKSHOT YANKEE was revealed to the public, which involved both classified and unclassified network intrusions of the “war-fighting Central Command.”[6] The book’s final example is the 2012 incident of Stuxnet and response Shamoon, which ‘instilled the deepest alarm to cybersecurity professionals”[7] due to the depth and breadth of the campaigns.   

One of the book’s strengths is the ‘state spectrum of responsibility" tool used to analyze the attacks on Estonia and Georgia and of Stuxnet, is valuable when knowing who to blame for the attacks without using attribution, the absolute knowledge of who did it. Another strength is the heavily notated chapters, for further research or personal review.

Conversely, a stylistic weakness is the repetition of several integral anecdotes, yet done in a way that breaks concentration and interrupts the cadence of story telling.

Overall, the book is beneficial for policymakers to have for a historical record of cyber conflict. The book speaks to the current trend of cybersecurity in that it provides a discussion of cyberwarfare, so it applies in an economic and a national security setting as well. It is a well-written book that arises from the historical theoretical debate. The book has several definitions that are clarified in the appendix. In the current literature, there are not really any other books with this stated intent. Students of cybersecurity in the policy side will benefit from reading this book as well as technicians or practitioners on the technical side. Because the book’s structure and examples are very clear, this book would easily be useful at a freshman class level yet robust up to graduate level scrutiny. Finally, I recommend this book as an exceptional work that can advise both beginners and advanced practitioners of the policy and the hard science side of cybersecurity. 
 

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[1] P. 10

[2] p. 31

[3] ibid

[4] p. 42

[5] p. 70

[6] p. 72

[7] p.74